



PRICE-FIXING AGREEMENT BETWEEN PRODUCERS'
COOPERATIVES EXEMPT FROM ANTITRUST LAWS
Defendants, two milk producers' cooperatives,' servicing the Baltimore
and District of Columbia areas respectively, were indicted under sections
1 and 3 of the Sherman Act 2 for conspiring to fix the price of milk sold
to distributors who supplied the Government at its Fort Meade military
installation. The district court held on a stipulation of facts admitting the
price-fixing that the conduct of the defendants was exempt from the pro-
visions of the Sherman Act by virtue of section 6 of the Clayton Act,8
sections 1 and 2 of the Capper-Volstead Act 4 and section 5 of the Coopera-
tive Marketing Act.5 United States v. Maryland Cooperative Milk Pro-
ducers, Inc., 145 F. Supp. 151 (D.D.C. 1956).
Barring an exemption from the antitrust laws, a conspiracy to fix-
prices is a per se violation of the Sherman Act.0 Section 6 of the Clayton
Act states that the "existence and operation" of agricultural cooperatives
are not within the interdict of the antitrust laws. 7 Individual members
1. The defendants were corporations, without capital stock, operated for the
mutual benefit of their members. Each handled and marketed the milk produced by its
members. Instant case at 153.
2. 26 STAT. 209 (1890), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 3 (1952). Section 1 states that "Every
contract, combination . . . or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among
the several States . . . is declared to be illegal. . . ." Section 3 provides that "Every
contract, combination . . . or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce . . . be-
tween the District of Columbia and any State or States . . . is declared illegal.. .. "
3. 38 STAT. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 17 (1952). "Nothing contained in the anti-
trust laws shall be construed to forbid the existence and operation of . . . agricul-
tural . . . organizations, instituted for the purpose of mutual help, and not having
capital stock or conducted for profit, or to forbid or restrain individual members of
such organizations from lawfully carrying out the legitimate objects thereof; nor
shall such organizations, or the members thereof, be held or construed to be illegal
combinations or conspiracies in restraint of trade, under the antitrust laws."
4. 42 STAT. 388 (1-922), 7 U.S.C. §§ 291, 292 (1952). See text at notes 12-13
infra.
5. 44 STAT. 802 (1926), 7 U.S.C. §§ 45-57 (1952). See text at note 19 infra.
6. Once price-fixing is established it is conclusively presumed to be illegal, thus
precluding the usual inquiry into the reasonableness of the restraint of trade. United
States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940); United States v. Trenton
Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392 (1927).
7. See note 3 supra. At common law agricultural producers' cooperatives were
held in some instances to be illegal restraints of trade, E.g., Burns v. Wray Farmers
Grain Co., 65 Colo. 425, 176 Pac. 487 (1918). The same result was reached under early
state antitrust laws. E.g., Georgia Fruit Exchange v. Turnipseed, 9 Ala. App. 123,
62 So. 542 (1913) ; Ford v. Chicago Milk Shippers Ass'n, 155 Ill. 166, 39 N.E. 651
(1895). See Hanna, Cooperative Associations and the Public, 29 MicH. L. RZv. 148,
159 (1930) ; Tobriner, Cooperative Marketing and the Restraint of Trade, 27 CoLum.
L. REv. 827 (1927) ; Note, Cooperatives and the An titritst Laws, 27 IND. L.J. 430
(1952). Some states specifically authorized cooperatives and exempted them from
state antitrust laws. Connolly v. Union Sewer Pipe Co., 184 U.S. 540 (1902) (ex-
emption of cooperatives violative of equal protection clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment) ; overruled in Tigner v. Texas, 310 U.S. 141 (1940). Other state acts stimu-
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of such cooperatives, "lawfully carrying out the legitimate objects thereof"
are also exempt.8 In United States v. King ' the district court held that
the Clayton Act exempted agricultural producers' cooperatives as
organizations from the antitrust laws, but that as such they are not priv-
ileged to adopt methods of carrying on business not permitted other business
associations.'0 The Capper-Volstead Act of 1922 11 permitted cooperatives
to have marketing agencies in common,12 but at the same time recognized
that cooperatives may monopolize or restrain trade by providing that where
the result is the "undue enhancement of prices," the Secretary of Agricul-
ture has the power to issue a cease and desist order.' 3 The Supreme Court
held in United States v. Borden Co.1 4 that the Capper-Volstead Act did
not grant the Secretary of Agriculture exclusive jurisdiction to deal with
cooperatives' restraints of trade,15 and that a conspiracy between a cooper-
ative and non-cooperative persons to fix prices constituted a violation of the
Sherman Act.16 In United States v. Dairy Cooperative Ass'n 17 it was
held that a cooperative acting alone could not be guilty of monopolizing
under section 2 of the Sherman Act. The Cooperative Marketing Act of
192618 authorized exchange of "past, present, and prospective . . ."
price, production and marketing data between agricultural producers' as-
sociations. 19 The instant case is the first to consider whether the exemp-
tion afforded agricultural cooperatives encompasses a price-fixing con-
spiracy between two such organizations.
The instant court relied on section 6 of the Clayton Act which pro-
vides in part that "such organizations . . . [are not] illegal combina-
tions or conspiracies in restraint of trade," 1o distinguishing the Borden
case on the ground that it involved a conspiracy between cooperative and
non-cooperative bodies.21 In distinguishing the case on its facts the court
lating cooperative growth have been validated in state courts. See cases collected in
Hanna, supra at 164 nn.48-49; see also Keegan, Power of Agricultural Co-operative
Associations To Limit Production, 26 MicH. L. Rzv. 648 (1928); Note, Co-opera-
tives-A Privileged Restraint of Trade, 23 NoTR" DAmn LAw. 110 (1947).
8. 38 STAT. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 17 (1952).
9. 250 Fed. 908 (D. Mass. 1916). Potato producers' cooperative blacklisted cer-
tain middlemen and threatened to boycott other middlemen who refused to suspend
dealings with those blacklisted. Demurrer to an indictment charging an unlawful re-
straint of trade was overruled.
10. Id. at 910.
11. 42 STAT. 388 (1922), 7 U.S.C. §§ 291-92 (1952). Principally the act extended
the Clayton Act exemption to cooperatives having capital stock.
12. 42 STAT. 388 (1922), 7 U.S.C. § 291 (1952).
13. 42 STAT. 389 (1922), 7 U.S.C. § 292 (1952). It does not appear that any
Secretary of Agriculture has ever issued a cease and desist order under this provision.
14. 308 U.S. 188 (1939).
15. Id. at 205-06.
16. Id. at 203-04; accord, United States v. Maryland & Virginia Milk Producers
Ass'n, 179 F.2d 426 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 831 (1949).
17. 49 F. Supp. 475 (D. Ore. 1943).
18. 44 STAT. 802 (1926), 7 U.S.C. §§ 451-57 (1952).
19. 44 STAT. 803 (1926), 7 U.S.C. § 455 (1952).
20. 38 STAT. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 17 (1952). See note 3 supra. The court was
particularly impressed by the fact that "organizations" was in the plural. Instant
case at 154. Its interpretation of this provision would in effect read in the words
"acting together" after the word "organizations."
21. Instant case at 153. See text at note 14 sutpra.
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appears to have disregarded the Supreme Court's interpretation of section
6, namely, that its impact was to exempt the cooperative form of organiza-
tion from being a restraint of trade in itself, but not to immunize coopera-
tives from the antitrust laws no matter what course of conduct they might
later adopt.22 The instant court sought further support for its position in
the Cooperative Marketing Act's approval of the exchange of "past, present,
and prospective" price, production and marketing data between coopera-
tive associations.P It does not necessarily follow, however, that because
of such an authorization two cooperatives may conspire to fix prices. Ex-
change of pricing, production and marketing data is not inconsistent with
the maintenance of competition between cooperatives 24 In the non-agri-
cultural field an industry wide exchange of past price information has not
in itself been sufficient to constitute an unreasonable restraint of trade 2
or to prove an agreement to fix prices. 8 Those cases involving exchange
of prospective price information in which Sherman Act violations were
sustained 2 7 have not denominated the exchange of such data as an unrea-
sonable restraint, but rather have held that a view of all the facts in the
respective cases indicate a concerted attempt to illegally restrain competi-
tion.2 8 Thus, authorization of the exchange of information would not
appear to be tantamount to authorization of price-fixing.
Price-fixing by two or more producers' cooperatives acting in concert
is permitted through the use of common marketing agencies which are
expressly sanctioned by the Capper-Volstead Act.2 9
The use of this device necessarily recognizes that a uniform price will
be charged for the member cooperatives' products, since the agency, which
22. 308 U.S. at 195; accord, United States v. King, 250 Fed. 908, 910 (D. Mass.
1916). A similar limitation has been placed upon the exemption of organized labor
found in the same section. Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443 (1921) ;
Bedford Cut Stone Co. v. Journeymen Stone Cutter's Ass'n, 274 U.S. 37 (1927).
23. Instant case at 154-55. See text at note 19 supra.
24. The conditions necessary for theoretically perfect competition include a mar-
ket place in which sellers and buyers have access to all relevant data concerning the
goods sold therein. GgtmiLL, FUNDAMENTALS Olt ECONOMics 343 (5th ed. 1949);
BLODGEr, PRINCIPLES ol EcoNomics 201 (rev. ed. 1946). Exchange of price infor-
mation among members of an industry can be used, however, as the basis for an
agreement that does restrain competition. See WILcox, Com rrloTiNT AND MONOPOLY
IN AM RICAN INDUSTRY 229-30 (TNEC Monograph No. 21, 1941).
25. Cement Manufacturers' Protective Ass'n v. United States, 268 U.S. 588
(1925); Maple Flooring Mfrs. Ass'n v. United States, 268 U.S. 563 (1925).
26. Maple Flooring Mfrs. Ass'n v. United States, 268 U.S. 563, 568, 572 (1925);
Cement Manufacturers Protective Ass'n v. United States, 268 U.S. 588 (1925). These
cases are explained in United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392,
400 (1927) and in United States v. Socony Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 217 (1940).
See REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAt's NATIONAL Comrras= To STUDY THE ANTI-
TRUST LAws 19-20 (1955).
27. American Column & Lumber Co. v. United States, 257 U.S. 377 (1921)
(trade association's "plan," a part of which involved exchange of price information
held an illegal restraint of trade as a concerted attempt to restrain competition);
accord, United States v. American Linseed Oil Co., 262 U.S. 371 (1923).
28. REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENRAm's NATIONAL Coumnmi To STUDY THE
ANTiRusT LAWS 18-19 (1955).
29. 42 STAT. 388 (1922), 7 U.S.C. § 291 (1952).
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is controlled by the voluntary agreement of the members, will not discrim-
inate between its own members. Common marketing agencies serve to
strengthen the bargaining position of the members by increasing the size
of the selling unit, and to achieve economies in distribution by increasing
the scale of operations. Such arrangements are also thought to eliminate
wasteful middlemen's profits by permitting direct dealings between con-
sumers and producer8 0  Price-fixing agreements, however, merely serve to
strengthen cooperatives' bargaining positions and do not decrease the par-
ticipating cooperatives' marketing costs. Whether two cooperatives choose
to fix prices with a common marketing agency agreement or without it will
not affect the price paid by the consumer, if the two cooperatives are the
dominant sellers in the market. Under either arrangement the price
charged will be at a level calculated to maximize the total return to the
cooperatives. Any cost advantages realized by the use of a common market-
ing agency would also accrue to the member cooperatives rather than to the
consuming public. But if the cooperatives acting in concert are subject to
competitive pressures from other sellers or dominant buyers with a resultant
reduction in prices, then the consuming public would benefit from the effi-
ciency of a common marketing agency. Price-fixing alone holds no such
potential benefit to the consumer. Furthermore, the fact that cooperatives
could achieve the same measure of price control by establishing a common
marketing agency, if they chose to do so, does not dictate that any price-
fixing scheme should be legalized. The use of these agencies is not deter-
mined solely by ability to influence prices. Economic factors, such as the
extent to which the cooperatives serve different markets, may negate the
feasibility of such a plan. Nor does price-fixing enjoy the express statutory
exemption afforded a common marketing agency. Since the common mar-
keting agency offers the possibility of benefit to the consumer, whereas
price-fixing alone offers none, the result of the instant case appears to be
an unwarranted extension of the exemption from the antitrust laws. 1
30. See Liberty Warehouse Co. v. Burley Tobacco Growers Co-operative Mar-
keting Ass'n, 276 U.S. 71 (1928), and the state court opinions cited therein; Tigner
v. Texas, 310 U.S. 141 (1940); REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S NATIONAL Com-
,riTu To STUDY THE ANTITRUST LAWS 306 (1955); MAYNARD & BECKMAN, PRIN-
crIs oP MARKIlNG 367-70 (4th ed. 1946); PAcm, LAW or CooPERATIvEs § 4b (3d
ed. 1956) ; Fowler, The Cooperative Yardstick, 13 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 445 (1948).
For support for the proposition that complete immunity from the antitrust laws is not
necessary for the attainment of these objectives, see REPORT O THE ATTORNEY GEN-
ERAi'S NATIONAL CoMmixEE To STUDY THE ANTITRUST LAWS.311 (1955); 5 ToUL-
miN, ANTI-TRUST LAws OV THE UNITED STATES §§ 6.21, 6.22 (1950); Hanna, Anti-
trust Immunities of Cooperative Associations, 13 LAw & CONTEmP. PROB. 488 (1948) ;
Ward, The Agricdtural Cooperative and Anti-Trust Laws, 30 DICTA 245 (1953);
Note, Cooperatives and the Anti-Trust Laws, 27 IND. L.J. 430 (1952).
31. Under the rule of the instant case the consumer is not without some protection,
for the Secretary of Agriculture is empowered by § 2 of the Capper-Volstead Act to
issue cease and desist orders where the result of cooperative action is an undue en-
hancement of prices. See text at note 13 supra. But this power is a limited one as the
Supreme Court stated in United States v. Borden Co., 308 U.S. 188 (1939). The Court
in that case specifically held that the conferring of this power on the Secretary of
Agriculture did not preclude independent action by the Attorney General under the
antitrust laws where appropriate. Id. at 204.
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Criminal Law-
SECOND DEGREE MURDER HELD AN OFFENSE
PUNISHABLE BY DEATH FOR PURPOSES OF
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
Defendant was convicted of second degree murder on an indictment
charging that he had "wilfully, feloniously and of his malice, aforethought" 1
murdered his common-law wife. Second degree murder carries a maximum
punishment of thirty-years imprisonment? Defendant claimed that because
he had not been indicted until four and one-half years after the killing,
3
the statute of limitations which stated that "no person shall be prosecuted,
tried or punished for an offense not punishable with death, unless the indict-
ment therefor shall be found within two years" 4 barred the imposition of
sentence. The trial court arrested judgment but the supreme court re-
versed, holding that murder is but one offense, the statutory degrees being
intended for "punishment alone." 1 Since murder in the first degree is
"punishable with death," 1 sentence could be imposed.7 State v. Brown, 22
N.J. 405, 126 A.2d 161 (1956).
An indictment for a crime will support conviction of a lesser included
offense.8 On this basis an indictment charging first degree murder per-
mits conviction of second degree murder 9 or manslaughter."0  However,
an indictment for a crime will not permit conviction of a lesser included
1. Instant case at 409, 126 A.2d at 163. The New Jersey indictment rule reads:
"(b) It shall be sufficient in every indictment for murder to charge that the de-
fendant did willfully [sic], feloniously and of his malice aforethought, kill and mur-
der the deceased.
"(c) It shall be sufficient in every indictment for manslaughter to charge that
the defendant did kill and slay the deceased." N.J. Sup. CT. (CRiM.) RULZ 3:4-3.
2. N.J. Riv. STAT. § 2A:113-4 (1951).
3. The delay in prosecution was caused by the defendant's hiding of his wife's
body. The New Jersey statute of limitations is not tolled when the accused conceals
the fact of the crime. Some state statutes provide to the contrary. See, e.g., IND.
STAT. ANN. § 9-305 (Burns 1956).
4. N.J. Rzv. STAT. § 2A:159-2 (1951). In 1953 the period of limitation was ex-
tended to five years. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A :159-2 (Supp. 1955). Because the two
year period had expired before the amendment, this longer period could not have been
applied to the defendant. Moore v. State, 43 NJ.L. 203 (1881).
5. Instant case at 412, 126 A.2d at 164.
6. N.J. Rlv. STAT. § 2A:113-4 (1951).
7. By this reasoning an indictment charging second degree murder alone could
be brought after the statute had run.
8. E.g., State v. Butler, 107 N.J.L. 91, 150 AtI. 394 (1930); Commonwealth v.
Schutte, 130 Pa. 272, 18 Atl. 635 (1889).
9. E.g., State v. Donohue, 2 -N.J. 381, 67 A.2d 152 (1949); Lloyd v. State, 206
Ind. 359, 189 N.E. 406 (1934).
10. E.g., State v. Ancell, 333 Mo. 26, 62 S.W.2d 443 (1933) ; Jackson v. State,
133 Neb. 786, 277 N.W. 92 (1938). "[An] indictment for murder in its legal effect
is a count for murder in the first degree, a count in the second degree, and a count for
manslaughter." State v. Huggins, 84 N.J.L. 254, 266, 87 Atl. 630, 635 (1913) (dissent-
ing opinion) (6-5).
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offense if an indictment for the lesser offense would have been barred by
the statute of limitations.1 One cannot be convicted of manslaughter on a
murder indictment if the statute of limitations bars an indictment for man-
slaughter.' A federal statute of limitations identical with that in the instant
case 13 prevents the imposition of any sentence for kidnapping in the ab-
sence of a finding that the victim was released harmed, since such a finding
is necessary for the imposition of the death penalty.14 For the purposes of
the federal statute of limitations, kidnapping constitutes separate offenses,
the demarcation being the victim's condition when released. Florida, the
only jurisdiction to apply an identical statute 1r to the problem of the
instant case, has held the statute to bar convictions of second degree
murder.16
The instant court reasoned that since "malice" is the essence and com-
mon element of both common-law murder and its statutory counterpart-
the degrees of murder-these degrees serve merely to recognize differences
in "moral turpitude" solely for the purposes of punishment.17 Had the in-
stant court chosen to consider the elements not common to both degrees, the
court would have reached the opposite conclusion.' 8 Conviction of first
11. E.g., People v. Picetti, 124 Cal. 361, 57 Pac. 156 (1899); Drott v. People, 71
Colo. 383, 206 Pac. 797 (1922) ; People v. DiPasquale, 161 App. Div. 196, 146 N.Y.
Supp. 523 (3d Dep't 1914); Annot., 47 A.L.R.2d 887 (1956). Contra, Jinks v. State
114 Ga. 430, 40 S.E. 320 (1901).
12. E.g., State v. Brossette, 163 La. 1035, 113 So. 366 (1927) ; People v. Burt, 51
Mich. 199, 16 N.W. 378 (1883).
13. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3281, 3282 (1952). The federal statute employs the phrase
"punishable by death." It apparently was the basis of the original New Jersey statute.
LAws OF N.J. 208 (1796).
14. United States v. Parrino, 180 F.2d 613 (2d Cir. 1950).
15. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 932.05 (1944).
16. Perry v. State, 103 Fla. 580, 137 So. 798 (1931) ; Blackmon v. State, 88 Fla.
188, 101 So. 319 (1924) ; Nelson v. State, 17 Fla. 195 (1879). Those statutes of lim-
itations which specifically exempt "murder" from their operation have been construed
to exempt all degrees of murder. E.g., Ex parte Conway, 118 Tex. Crim. 148, 37
S.W.2d 1017 (1931); State v. Erving, 19 Wash. 435, 53 Pac. 717 (1898). "
17. Instant case at 412, 126 A2d at 164. The court quoted with approval the
statement in Graves v. State, 45 N.J.L. 347, 358 (1883), that the statute creating two
degrees of murder ".... did not make murder in the first a separate and distinct crime
from murder of the second. . . " However, this statement was made in holding that
an indictment identical with that of the instant case (see text at note 1 supra) suffi-
ciently informed the defendant of first degree murder not to conflict with the consti-
tutional requirement that the accused be . . . informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation." U.S. Cows'. amend. VI; N.J. CoNsTr. art I, § 8 (1844).
18. The opposite conclusion has been reached in the context of double jeopardy.
Some states hold that defendant's appeal for a new trial does not waive double jeop-
ardy protection for any higher offense for which the defendant could have been con-
victed. See cases collected in ALI, ADINISTRATIoy OF THE CkimNiAL LAW : DOURLE
JgopARDY 123-25 (1935) ; Note, 71 U.S.L. RZv. 421, 423 (1937). In these states the
problem of distinguishing the statutory degrees of murder arises when a new trial is
granted after a conviction of second degree murder on an indictment charging "mur-
der.' Conviction of second degree is held to be an implied acquittal of first degree
rather than a conviction of "murder," thereby prohibiting a subsequent conviction of
first degree murder. By so holding these states impliedly recognize the degrees as sep-
arate offenses. Thomas v. State, 255 Ala. 632, 53 So. 2d 340 (1951) ; Johnson v. State,
29 Ark. 31 (1874); State v. Naylor, 28 Del. 99, 90 AtI. 88 (1913) ; Commoiwealth
v. Dietrick, 221 Pa. 7, 70 At1. 275 (1908) ; Radej v. State, 152 Wis. 503, 140 N.W. 21
(1913). Contra, People v. McNeer, 14 Cal. App. 2d 22, 57 P2d 1018* (1936) (reason-
ing identical with instant case). States which hold that a defendant's appeal from a
second degree murder conviction constitutes a waiver of double jeopardy protection
never have to reach the issue of whether the degrees are separate offenses.
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degree murder requires proof of intent to kill and of premeditation and
deliberation 1) or proof that the killing was perpetrated in the commission
of a named felony,20 none of which is essential to conviction of murder
in the second degree.' 1  Furthermore, the jury must "consider" and "de-
termine" the issue of degree.2 2  It would appear more proper, however, to
resolve the issue by an analysis of the purpose of the statute of limitations
and of the exception to it.2 3
The bar to prosecution imposed by criminal statutes of limitations
necessarily recognizes that society is being exposed to some persons who in
fact are guilty of a crime and are not rehabilitated. 24 These statutes, none-
theless, place a greater value on the chance that guilty persons who have
not repeated their errors during the statutory period are self-rehabilitated 25
and on protection of the accused against the increased likelihood that con-
victions not warranted by actual events will result from the evidentiary
19. N.J. Rv. STAT. § 2A:113-2 (1951) ; State v. Mangano, 77 N.J.L. 544, 72 Atl.
366 (1909).
20. N.J. Rtv. STAT. § 2A:113-2 (1951) ; State v. Turco, 99 N.J.L. 96, 122 Atl.
844 (1923).
21. N.J. Riv. STAT. § 2A:113-2 (1951); State v. Moynihan, 93 N.J.L. 253, 106
At. 817 (1919). A conviction of first degree murder can be reversed for a new trial
or reduced to second degree if the evidence does not establish premeditation and delib-
eration. E.g., People v. Caruso, 246 N.Y. 437, 159 N.E. 390 (1927) (new trial); An-
derson v. State, 26 Neb. 387, 41 N.W. 951 (1889) (reduced to second degree). The
elements which distinguish first from second degree murder must be proven beyond
a reasonable doubt. Brown v. State, 62 N.J.L. 666, 715 (1899) (dictum); State v.
Agnew, 10 N.J.L. 165 (Oyer & Ter. 1887) (charge to jury).
22. State v. Cooper, 2 N.J. 540, 549, 67 A.2d 298, 302 (1949). The instant court
raised the following question: if the defendant could not be punished for second de-
gree murder because not an offense punishable with death, ". . . would a verdict of
murder in the first degree with life imprisonment be also within the ban ... ?" Instant
case at 414, 126 A.2d at 165. There is authority for answering the question in the
negative. The difference between the two degrees of murder is one of proof. See text
at notes 19-20 supra. Consequently the trial judge may comment on the evidence relat-
ing to premeditation and deliberation. State v. Overton, 85 N.J.L. 287, 88 Atl. 689
(1913). However, the imposition of life imprisonment is an act of jury discretion, not
based on proof. Therefore, the trial judge cannot comment on the question of life im-
prisonment. State v. Martin, 92 N.J.L. 436, 106 AtU. 385 (1919). This distinction is
made in the area of double jeopardy. In those states discussed in note 18 supra, al-
though an appeal does not waive double jeopardy protection for those offenses of which
the defendant was impliedly acquitted, a conviction of first degree murder with a life
sentence does not prevent a subsequent conviction with the death penalty. Mann v.
State, 23 Fla. 610, 3 So. 207 (1887); State v. Kneeskern, 203 Iowa 929, 210 N.W.
465 (1926) ; Commonwealth v. Alessio, 313 Pa. 537, 169 Atl. 764 (1934) ; Eason v.
State, 6 Baxt. 431 (Tenn. 1873).
23. "The question is in essence one of legislative intent." Instant case at 415, 126
A.2d at 166. The legislature may not have thought that it was exempting second
degree murder from the statute because in the same statutory revision that adopted
the "punishable with death" wording, the maximum punishment for second degree
murder was fixed at thirty years. LAws op N.J. 825, 919 (1898). The Alabama statute
exempts indictments for offenses "which may be punished capitally, or for murder in
the second degree." ALA. CoDn ANN. tit. 15, § 219 (1940). New Mexico has specifi-
cally imposed a six-year limitation on second degree murder. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-9-1
(1953).
24. See Note, Statute of Limitations in Criminal Law-A Penetrable Barrier to
Prosecution, 102 U. PA. L. Rtv. 630 (1954).
25. Id. at 633-34. See also CHArde, THIRTY-Fn YrARs WITH FRIOMO o
SrXcH 28 (1952). Those who continue to violate criminal laws can, of course, be
punished for their more recent offenses. Incarceration of the rehabilitated represents
an economic waste to the state. See Note, 101 U. PA. L. Rxv. 257 (1952).
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risks fostered by the passage of time.26 The most important of these risks
are the lessened accuracy of evidence 27 and the defendant's decreased abil-
ity to produce once available evidence in his behalf.2 8 In a prosecution for
murder, the consequence of the accused's inability to obtain evidence is par-
ticularly acute in view of the severity of the penalty. His difficulties are
further compounded when, as in the instant case,2 he admits the killing but
claims that he is either guiltless30 or only guilty of manslaughter.S1 In
the instant jurisdiction the state is entitled to a jury charge that once the
fact of killing by the accused is established, there is a presumption of second
degree murder.3 2  Defendant then has the burden of proving 3 his denial
of culpability or his assertion of mitigating circumstances. 34 To the extent
that the passage of time renders the defendant less able to carry his burden
of proof, the probability of a conviction not warranted by actual events is
increased to a greater degree than if the defendant had only the practical
burden of raising a reasonable doubt. With the most serious crimes, how-
ever, the desire for retribution 3 5 and the increased danger to society pre-
sented by unrehabilitated individuals have been thought to outweigh the risk
of punishing the innocent and the likelihood that the guilty are self-
rehabilitated, accounting for the "punishable with death" exception in the
instant statute of limitations. Yet application of this exception to one
convicted of second degree murder would not appear to be consistent with
26. People v. Ross, 325 Il1. 417, 421, 156 N.F_ 303, 304 (1927) ; People ex rel.
Reibman v. Warden of the County Jail at Salem, N.Y., 242 App. Div. 282, 284, 275
N.Y. Supp. 59, 62 (3d Dep't 1934); 1 WHARTON, CRIMINAL PRoCMDURn 415 (11th ed.
1927).
27. Dallenbach, The Relation of Memory Error to Time Interval, 20 PsYcH.
REV. 323 (1913) ; Hutchins & Slesinger, Some Observations on the Law of Eddence
-Memory, 41 HARv. L. Rm. 860 (1928). See also LEVlN, EVIDENCE AND THE BE-
HAVIORAL SCIENCES B-314-20 (mimeo. 1956).
28. See United States v. Eliopoulis, 45 F. Supp. 777, 781 (D.N.J. 1942).
29. The defendant confessed to the killing. State v. Brown, 22 N.J. 405, 126 A.2d
161 (1956), Joint Appendix, pp. 7a-15a, 27a.
30. N.J. REv. STAT. § 2A:113-6 (1951) (defense of life, prevention of named
crime and misadventure).
31. If the defendant had been found guilty of manslaughter he would have been
within the protection of the statute of limitations. Instant case at 408, 126 A.2d at
163 (dictum). The defendant was originally indicted solely for manslaughter, 16ut this
indictment was nol prossed because barred by the statute. Ibid. Defendant claimed
that he killed in heat of passion because reasonably provoked. State v. Brown, 22
N.J. 405, 126 A.2d 161 (1956), Joint Appendix, p. 25a.
32. State v. Wynn, 21 N.J. 264, 270, 121 A.2d 534, 538 (1956); State v. Man-
gano, 103 N.J.L. 475, 477, 156 At. 430, 432 (1931).
33. This burden is a practical one growing out of a jury charge that "... the
presumption is in law that . . . [the killing] is murder in the second degree.., unless
and until the defendant produces facts and circumstances from which justification,
excuse, or extenuation may arise." State v. Brown, 22 N.J. 405, 126 A2d 161 (1956),
Joint Appendix-, p. 23a.
34. Because of the passage of time, the defendant's claim that he was reasonably
provoked and killed in a transport of passion could not have been supported by evi-
dence of bodily injuries, or of broken objects or of witnesses who remembered a fra-
cas.
35. See BRADLrY, ETHICAL STuDms 41 (2d ed. 1927); Sharp & Otto, A Study
of the Popular Attitude Toward Retributive Punishment, 20 INT'L J. op ET HlCS 341
(1910).
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the basis for the exception. Although second degree murder is punishable
with a maximum of thirty-years imprisonment, no minimum period is
prescribed, 3 whereas all first degree murderers are either incarcerated for
life or executed.3 7 The great disparity between the respective minimum and
maximum penalties expresses a legislative judgment that there is both a
greater probability of rehabilitation and a concomitant lesser risk to society
from one guilty of second degree murder than from one guilty of first degree
murder. s A person guilty of either rape or attempted kidnapping would
appear to be as dangerous as one guilty of second degree murder, for all
three offenses carry identical minimum and maximum punishments in the
instant jurisdiction; 3 9 yet the former crimes are within the protection
afforded by the statute of limitations. If the legislature distinguishes the
kinds of peril to society resulting from criminal activity in terms of length
of imprisonment, then it would seem that the scope of the exception in the
statute should be similarly determined,40 regardless of whether the crime is
of common-law or statutory origin.
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure-
FEDERAL RULES NOT APPLICABLE TO DISBARMENT
PROCEEDINGS
An attorney against whom disbarment proceedings were being
brought in Alaska,' gave notice under rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure 2 to take the deposition of the United States attorney who had
filed the information instigating the proceedings. The notice was quashed
by the district court, and affirmed by the circuit court which held that since
disbarment is not an adversary proceeding, it is not a "civil" suit within the
contemplation of the rules. Coughlan v. United States, 236 F.2d 927 (9th
Cir. 1956).
36. N.J. Rzv. STAT. § 2A:113-4 (1951).
37. Ibid.
38. "From an administrative point of view they [second degree murderers] are
the best group in the institution [Massachusetts State Prison]." Field, The Attitudes
of Prisoners as a Factor in Rehabilitation, The Annals of the American Academy of
Political and Social Science, Sept. 1931, p. 151.
39. N.J. Rtv. STAT. § 2A :118-2 (1951) (attempted kidnapping); N.J. Pv. STAT.
§2A:138-1 (1951) (rape).
40. "The statute, when it wiped out all limitations by the words 'punishable by
death,' did not make the character of the crime the test, but the penalty that could be
imposed on it. . . ." United States v. Parrino, 180 F.2d 613, 615 (2d Cir. 1950)
(Learned Hand, J.).
1. The appellant was convicted of the felony of embezzlement. Shortly afterwards
an information seeking his disbarment was filed by the United States attorney and
later amended. Meanwhile the appellant's conviction was reversed on the grounds that
the prosecution should have been brought for a misdeameanor. Subsequently, the
United States attorney filed a second amended information. Instant case at 927.
2. "Any party may take the testimony of any person, including a party, by depo-
sition upon oral examination or written interrogatories for the purpose of discovery
or for use as evidence in the action or for both purposes." FtD. R. Civ. P. 26(a).
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The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure govern procedure "in the United
States district courts in all suits of a civil nature whether cognizable as
cases in law or in equity . . . ." a Rule 81, however, specifically excludes
from coverage admiralty, bankruptcy and copyright actions; 4 similarly,
probate, adoption and lunacy are excluded in the United States District
Court for the District of ColumbiaY Certain other actions, including ad-
mission to citizenship, are stated to be within the rules except to the extent
that practice is prescribed in other statutes.0 The rules do not specify
whether disbarment proceedings are "civil" actions, and state courts are
divided on the issue. The majority of state jurisdictions have held that
disbarment is neither civil 7 nor criminal,8 but rather sui generis, since it
is merely the disciplinary proceedings of the court against one of its own
officers.9 This being the case, all that is required in order to satisfy due
process is that an attorney be given notice and a hearing, the form of which
is a matter of judicial discretion.'0 Two of the federal district courts have
provided in their local rules that the Federal Rules shall apply to disbar-
ment proceedings."
Though the court in the instant case found disbarment to be outside the
Federal Rules because not an adversary proceeding, naturalization, a non-
adversary proceeding,' 2 is within the rules to the extent that specific stat-
utes fail to denote procedure.12 Even assuming that the Federal Rules were
3. FrD. R. Civ. P. 1.
4. Fti. R. Civ. P. 81(a) (1). For a discussion of the extent to which the rules
have been applied to admiralty and bankruptcy by the courts, see Note, 4 F D. RuLes
Si.Rv. 950 (1941) (admiralty); Note, 7 FXD. Ru.s Smv. 983 (1944) (bankruptcy).
5. F w. R. Crv. P. 81(a) (1).
6. FED. R. Civ. P. 81 (a) (2). The Federal Rules have been held to be applicable
to denaturalization proceedings, United States v. Jerome, 115 F. Supp. 818 (S.D.N.Y.
1954), and also to suits against the federal government under the Tucker Act, 28
U.S.C. § 1491 (1952), Eastern Air Transp. Co. v. United States, 159 F.2d 349 (2d
Cir. 1947). See also Comment, 4 FFa. RULEs Szav. 382 (1941). Contra, Lynn v.
United States, 110 F.2d 586 (5th Cir. 1940).
7. There are several jurisdictions which hold that it is civil and hence should be
governed by the recognized rules of procedure for civil actions. Wernimont v. State,
ex rel. Little Rock Bar Ass'n, 101 Ark. 210, 142 S.W. 194 (1911); Houtchens v.
Mercer, 119 Tex. 431, 29 S.W.2d 1031 (1930).
8. There is some authority for the proposition that disbarment partakes of the
nature of a quasi-criminal action. Strickland v. Willingham, 49 Ga. App. 355, 175 S.E.
605 (1934); State ex rel. Turner v. Denman, 36 Tenn. App. 673, 259 S.W.2d 891
(1952) ; It re Little, 40 Wash. 2d 421, 244 P.2d 255 (1952).
9. E.g., In the Matter of Lavine, 126 F. Supp. 39 (S.D. Cal. 1954) ; State Bd. of
Law Examiners v. Brown, 53 Wyo. 42, 77 P.2d 626 (1938) ; In re Ankelis, 164 Ore.
645, 108 P.2d 715 (1940).
10. Ex parte Wall, 107 U.S. 265 (1892) ; Randall v. Brigham, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.)
523 (1868); Garfield v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 32 App. D.C. 109 (1908);
In re Gladstone, 28 F. Supp. 858 (S.D.N.Y. 1939).
11. EAST4RN Div. VoR S.D. op CAL. Ruz 1(g) (7), 20 F u. Ruits Sv. 949
(1955); DisrnucT CouarT roR HAwMA RuL 1(e) (7), 21 RED. RULtES SEv. 875 (1955).
Local rules for United States district courts are adopted under FXD. R. CiV. P. 83.
12. United States v. Brass, 37 F. Supp. 698 (E.D.N.Y. 1941).
13. Fm. R. Civ. P. 81(a) (2). Probate, adoption and lunacy are also non-adver-
sary. State ex rel. Callahan v. Hess, 348 Mo. 388, 153 S.W.2d 713 (1941) ; Powell v.
Watkins, 172 N.C. 244, 90 S.E. 207 (1916) (probate); Johnson v. Smith, 203 Ind.
214, 176 N.E. 705 (1931) (adoption); In re Ryan, 291 Mich. 673, 289 N.W. 291
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designed to govern adversary proceedings, it does not necessarily follow
that non-adversary actions are outside their scope. An analysis of the
other exclusions would suggest to a court seeking a rule for the general
applicability of the rules, the conclusion that the Federal Rules present a
"civil as opposed to criminal" dichotomy into which all cases fall unless
specifically provided otherwise. 14 If the traditional concept of "civil suits"
had been contemplated, there would have been no need for explicit exclusion
of either bankruptcy or admiralty, since neither of these actions are within
this category.15
The focal question presented by the instant case is whether discovery
should be available to an attorney in view of the severity of the potential
damage to both the attorney's professional standing and his reputation in
the community.' 6 An attorney in a disbarment proceeding is not given the
protection afforded by a criminal burden of proof, the proof required being
only a preponderance.7 Neither is he given a jury trial,'8 nor does the
notice and hearing to which he is entitled have to be of a formal nature.1
Although discovery is limited in criminal trials in fear of a criminal inspect-
ing the files of a law enforcement agency and the belief that discovery would
make subornation of perjury easier,20 this reasoning does not have any
(1939) (lunacy). The District of Columbia Code provides detailed rules of procedure
governing these actions. D.C. CoDa- ANN. §§ 16-201 to 07 (1951) (adoption), 21-301 to
33 (lunacy), 18-401 to 530 (1951) (probate). However, the local rules of the District
Court for the District of Columbia apply the Federal Rules to probate, lunacy and
adoption "so far as practicable and to the extent that matters of procedure are not
specifically provided by statutes or rules of this court" DIsT. CoUTa roR DIsT. ov
COLUMBIA Ru- 1(b), 4 FED. RuI.-s SERV. 1028 (1941).
14. This is in accord with the statement of Professor Moore: ".
Rules 1 and 81 construed together indicate that the Federal Rules apply to all civil
actions, as distinguished from criminal suits, coming before the district courts with
the exceptions specifically stated in Rule 81." 2 Moon, FEDERAL Pa c1rc 14 (2d ed.
1948).
15. Lewis v. United Airlines Transp. Corp., 29 F. Supp. 112, 118 (D. Conn. 1939)
(admiralty held not to be within federal venue statute) ; It re Louisville Underwrit-
ers, 134 U.S. 488 (1890) (statute providing that no person shall be arrested in one
district for trial in any other district in a civil action, does not apply to Admiralty) ;
Atkins v. Fibre Disintegrating Co., 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 272 (1873) (civil suit as used
in judiciary Act does not include Admiralty). Wilkinson v. Goodfellow-Brooks Shoe
Co., 141 Fed. 218, 220 (C.C. E.D. Mo. 1905) (bankruptcy not mere civil suit, but
sui generis).
16. It is the law in most jurisdictions that an attorney who is disbarred in a court
of competent jurisdiction can be summarily disbarred in another jurisdiction. E.g.,
ALASKA Comsp. LAWS ANN. § 35-2-71(8) (1949). See also In re Ulmer, 268 Mass.
373, 167 N.E. 749 (1929) ; In re Brown, 60 S.D. 628, 245 N.W. 824 (1932).
17. Louisville Bar Ass'n v. Hubbard, 282 Ky. 734, 139 S.W.2d 773 (1940)',
In re Rieby, 328 Mass. 542, 105 N.E.2d 234 (1952).
18. Ex parte Wall, 107 U.S. 265 (1882) ; Johnson v. State Bar, 4 Cal. 2d 744, 52
P.2d 928 (1935); Memphis & Shelby County Bar Ass'n v. Vicks, 290 S.W.2d 871
(Tenn. 1955).
19. Phipps v. Wilson, 186 F.2d 748 (7th Cir. 1951); Grievance Comm. v. Sinn,
128 Conn. 419, 23 A.2d 516 (1941) ; In re Lenox, 371 Ill. 505, 21 N.E.2d 721 (1939).
20. See ORFIELD, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE FRoM ARREsT To AvppFA 321-22 (1947) ;
Note, The Scope of Criminal Discovery Against the Government, 67 HARv. L. REv.
492 (1954).
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basis for application to disbarment.2 ' Even though discovery is limited
in criminal actions, it is still made available to a defendant by rule 16 of
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.2 It would appear to be paradox-
ical to deny discovery to an attorney in a disbarment proceeding because
it is sui generis while making it available to a party in both civil and crim-
inal actions. The allowance of discovery in this case would permit an
attorney to ascertain the pertinent facts in issue more readily, thereby aid-
ing the preparation of a proper defense and assuring a more equitable adju-
dication on the facts. The force of this argument has apparently been rec-
ognized by the two district courts who have applied the Federal Rules to
disbarment by their local rulesP In the absence of a determination that
the federal courts are bound to apply the Federal Rules to disbarment pro-
ceedings, adoption by local rule appears to be an appropriate resolution of
the problem.
Indispensable Parties-
RETIREMENT COMMITTEE INDISPENSABLE, TRUSTEE
NOT INDISPENSABLE PARTY IN AN ACTION TO
COMPEL PAYMENT OF FUNDS OF PENSION TRUST
Widow sued husband's former employer in a federal court in Texas'
for an injunction to compel employer, an Illinois corporation, to initiate
action necessary to obtain funds allegedly due under a pension trust. An
Ohio bank held the fund, contributed by the corporate employer, in trust
with power to invest and distribute the funds; but payment of benefits
could be made only upon express direction of the retirement committee,
composed of three of the corporation's employees residing in Illinois. Both
the trustee and the retirement committee were appointed and subject to re-
21. Under the Federal Rules, upon motion made by any party for good cause
shown, the court may order that the deposition not be taken or limit the taking of it
as the court deems proper. F0o. R. Civ. P. 30(b). After the taking of the deposition
has begun, a party, upon showing that it is being used to annoy, embarrass, or oppress
may move the court to limit or stop the further taking. Fzo. R. Civ. P. 30(d). Discov-
ery as to documents under rule 34 is also subject to rule 30(b). The same is true as
to interrogatories under rule 33.
22. "Upon motion of a defendant at any time after the filing of the indictment
or information, the court may order the attorney for the government to pdrmit the
defendant to inspect . . . documents or tangible objects, obtained from or belonging
to the defendant or obtained from others by seizure or by process. . . ." F4D. R.
CaiM. P. 16. For a discussion of discovery in criminal cases, see Note, The Scope of
Criminal Discovery Against the Government, 67 HARv. L. Rzv. 492 (1954).
23. See note 11 supra.
1. Federal jurisdiction was sought on diversity of citizenship involving an amount
over $3,000. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1952).
2. The circuit court construed the case as "not involv[ing] a request that a non-
resident court (in Texas) undertake direction, supervision, or control over the man-
agement of a Trust which, of necessity, must answer alone to the courts of the state
(Ohio) where it is maintained. . . " Instant case at 172.
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moval at the will of the employer.3 The retirement committee refused to
direct payment to plaintiff's husband. The district court held the retire-
ment committee and the trustee to be indispensable parties and dismissed
the case for want of jurisdiction. The circuit court reversed and remanded,
holding that the trustee was not an indispensable party and directed the
corporate employer to make the retirement committee available to the court
as a party.4 Ball v. Victor Adding Machine Co., 236 F.2d 170 (5th Cir.
1956).
Rule 19(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure which provides
that persons having a joint-interest must be joined in the same suit,6 in-
corporated the common law of indispensable parties, stated in 1854 by
the Supreme Court in Shields v. Barrows.7 Absence of an indispensable
party deprives a court of jurisdiction over the claim," but joinder of an
indispensable party deprives a federal court of diversity jurisdiction if the
plaintiff and an indispensable defendant are residents of the same state.9 As
a practical matter, holding a party to be indispensable may make it impos-
sible for a plaintiff to obtain a forum to litigate his claim, for if indispensable
parties reside in different states, service may not be obtainable.' 0 Courts
have recognized that "there is no prescribed formula for determining in
every case whether a person or corporation is an indispensable party or not.
S. . ,, 11 The principle applicable to the determination is the avoidance
of a multiplicity of suits by attempting to provide a complete remedy, while
3. The relevant provisions of the pension plan were:
"Article 10, Section 10.2(b). Any trustee appointed hereunder may be removed
by resolution of the Board of Directors of the company.
"Article 3, Section 3.1. The Board of Directors of the Company shall appoint
forthwith a Retirement Committee of three (3) members to hold office during the
pleasure of the Board.
"Article 3, Section 3.8. The Committee on behalf of the participants shall enforce
the plan in accordance with the terms of the Trust Agreement, and shall have all pow-
ers necessary . . . (a) to determine all questions relating to the eligibility of employees
to become participants, (b) to compute and certify to the Trustee the amount and kind
of benefits payable to participants." Instant case at 177-78.
"Article 6, Section 6.1. The company will make . . . payment to the trustee of
such amounts of money as may be necessary from time to time, according to the cer-
tification of the committee, to provide the benefits to which participants and their ben-
eficiaries are entitled under the plan." Transcript of Record, p. 17.
4. Instant case at 174.
5. "Necessary Joinder. Subject to the provisions of Rule 23 and of subdivision
(b) of this rule, persons having a joint interest shall be made parties and be joined
on the same side as plaintiffs or defendants ... ." Fzo. R. CIv. P. 19(a).
6. Wesson v. Crain, 165 F.2d 6 (8th Cir. 1948); United States v. Washington
Institute of Technology, 138 F2d 25 (3d Cir. 1943).
7. "Persons [are indispensable parties] who not only have an interest in the con-
troversy but an interest of such a nature that a final decree cannot be made without
either affecting that interest, or leaving the controversy in such a condition that its
final termination may be wholly inconsistent with equity and good conscience." 58 U.S.
(17 How.) 130, 139 (1854).
8. Id. at 136; Neher v. Harwood, 128 F.2d 846 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 317 U.S.
659 (1942).
9. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1952); Wilson v. Oswego Township, 151 U.S. 56 (1894).
10. Fi . R. Civ. P. 4(f), in the absence of a statutory exception, limits process
service to the territorial limits of the state in which the district court sits. State
jurisdiction is generally limited by due process requirements to individuals and prop-
erty physically within the territory of the state. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877);
McGStHL, Dme PRoctss oit LAW 85-93 (1906).
11. Niles-Bement-Pond Co. v. Iron Moulders Union, 254 U.S. 77, 80 (1920).
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not "affecting" the interests of parties not before the court.12  In some sit-
uations where plaintiff's remedy requires affirmative action by an outside
party, that party is indispensable. Thus, in suits contesting the ownership
of stock, where plaintiff seeks a transfer on the corporation's records of
defendant's shares, the corporation is an indispensable party; 13 and where
plaintiff's remedy calls for disposition of property, the title holder or pos-
sessor of that property is generally indispensable. 14 But where a property
holder not before the court is bound by contract to deliver the property
upon the order of a party or parties before the court, the issue of indis-
pensability has produced conflicting results in the Supreme Court.15 In
Wilson v. Oswego Township 16 a contractor sued to obtain bonds in
the possession of a savings association which were to be delivered upon
completion of certain railroad work on demand of the contractor and a co-
trustee representing the township that issued the bonds. The court held
that even though the co-trustee would be before it, the savings association
was, nevertheless, an indispensable party.17  In Salem Trust Co. v. Manu-
facturers' Finance Co.' 8 two assignees of the same debt contracted with a
trust company to hold debtor's payment pending ascertainment of the
party entitled to it. The trust company was held not to be an indispensable
party in a suit between the assignees. 1 Although the Supreme Court in
Salem attempted to distinguish that case from Wilson,20 they appear to be
contra. In both cases the holder of the property was a mere stakeholder
under an obligation to turn over the property when a controversy between
other parties had been decided.
12. See note 7 supra. See also Kendig v. Dean, 97 U.S. 423 (1878) (corporation
indispensable party where plaintiff seeks transfer of defendant's stock) ; Parker Rust-
Proof Co. v. Western Union Tel. Co., 105 F.2d 976 (2d Cir. 1939) (inventor-assignor
not indispensable party to suit for issuance of patent). Compare Kroese v. General
Castings Corp., 179 F2d 760 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 983 (1950) (majority
of board of directors not indispensable parties in suit by shareholder for declaration
of a dividend), with Schuckman v. Rubenstein, 164 F.2d 952 (6th Cir. 1947), cert. de-
nied, 333 U.S. 875 (1948) (majority of board of directors are indispensable in suit by
shareholder for declaration of a dividend).
13. Crump v. Thurber, 115 U.S. 56 (1885); Kendig v. Dean, 97 U.S. 423 (1878).
Compare Krose v. General Castings Corp., 179 F.2d 760 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 339
U.S. 983 (1950), with Schuckman v. Rubenstein, 164 F2d 952 (6th Cir. 1947), cert.
denied, 333 U.S. 875 (1949). See also Whittemore v. Continental Mills, 98 F. Supp.
387 (D. Me. 1951). Federal courts in diversity cases have encountered difficulty decid-
ing whether state substantive or federal procedural law applies to the determination
of indispensable parties. See, e.g., Baker v. Dale, 123 F. Supp. 364, 367 (W.D. Mo.
1954). Contra, Ford v. Adkins, 39 F. Supp. 472 (E.D. Ill. 1941).
14. Massachusetts & So. Constr. Co. v. Cane Creek Township, 155 U.S. 283
(1894) ; Peper v. Fordyce, 119 U.S. 469 (1886) ; Thayer v. Life Ass'n, 112 U.S. 717
(1885) ; Woodward v. McConnaughey, 106 Fed. 758 (9th Cir. 1901) ; Scoutt v. Keck,
73 Fed. 900 (8th Cir. 1896); Rhoads v. Nat'1 Iron Bank, 35 F. Supp. 650 (E.D. Pa.
1940).
15. Salem Trust Co. v. Manufacturers' Finance Co., 264 U.S. 182 (1924). Cmtra,
Wilson v. Oswego Township, 151 U.S. 56 (1894) (alternative holding).
16. 151 U.S. 56 (1894) (alternative holding).
17. Ibid.
18. 264 U.S. 182 (1924).
19. Ibid.
20. Id. at 190. The Court stated that Wilson was distinguishable since in Salem,
no cause of action existed against the trust company because it had not been determined
which of the assignees was entitled to payment.
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Determination of the indispensability of a party not before the court
should not turn solely on the fact of title or possession of the property in
dispute, but rather on an analysis of the property holder's right to with-
hold the property in opposition to the court's decision. Where the outside
party has no interest in the final disposition of the property held, and is
bound by an agreement to distribute according to the directions of one or
both parties to the litigation, the outside party should not be held to be
indispensable; but where the outside party may exercise discretion in
making payment and that discretion is not actually controlled by a party
to the litigation, it must be joined as indispensable to make the decree
effective as a final determination of the rights of the parties.2 1 The trustee,
in the instant case, although a title holder, has no discretion in the disposi-
tion of the fund.3 The terms of the pension trust agreement obligates
it to pay at the direction of the retirement committee.23 Whether this direc-
tion will be forthcoming will depend solely upon the resolution of the con-
troversy between the committee and the beneficiary. Although the trustee
has the physical power to withhold payment, it has nothing to gain by such
action, thereby making remote the possibility that a second suit will have
to be brought to complete the relief. Moreover, if the Ohio trustee is
found to be indispensable, plaintiff as a practical matter will probably be
unable to litigate her claim, since if the retirement committee composed of
Illinois citizens is also indispensable, obtaining service will present a
barrier.2 4 In such a position the trustee should not be held indispensable
to the controversy in question.
The retirement committee, on the other hand, is in a different position
from that of the trustee. According to the terms of the pension plan agree-
ment, payment could only be made upon direction of the retirement com-
mittee. 3 But the employer has the right to appoint and remove the re-
tirement committee at will, thereby giving him potential control of the com-
mittee's decisions and affording him an opportunity to decrease his contri-
butions to the fund by curbing the amount of benefits paid. The exercise
of this control, however, is restrained by the ill-will likely to be engendered
in the employees, with attendant labor disputes, and even more effectively
by the probability that the Internal Revenue Service, if apprised that the
employer is not maintaining the fund for "the exclusive benefit of [the]
employees," 26 will withdraw its approval of the pension plan. Without
such approval the employer will not receive maximum tax benefits for his
21. See, e.g., Thayer v. Life Ass'n, 112 U.S. 717 (1885) (where the object of the
suit was to prevent the selling of property). See also the test formulated in Washington
v. United States, 87 F.2d 421, 427-28 (9th Cir. 1936).
22. See note 3 supra. The instant case is distinguishable from Kane v. Lewis, 282
App. Div. 529, 125 N.Y.S.2d 544 (3d Dep't 1953) where the trustees of a pension fund
had wide discretionary powers in regard to distribution. See DEARING, INDUSTRIAL
PSNSIONS 99-100 (1954).
23. See note 3 supra.
24. See note 10 supra.
25. See note 3 supra.
26. INT. Rmv. CoDm or 1954, § 401.
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contributions. 27  Employer's power to control does not, therefore, appear
to foreclose the possibility that the retirement committee is exercising its
own judgment rather than following the dictates of its employer. Conse-
quently, if only the employer and an employee are parties to a suit deciding
the employee's right to pension payment, the retirement committee, not
having been a party to the action, would not be bound by that disposition,
thereby preventing a final determination of the employee's rights. But if
the corporate employer does in fact dictate the decisions of the retirement
committee, then it would appear that the presence of the retirement com-
mittee would not be necessary to a final determination; the court could
order the employer to have the committee direct the trustee to act accord-
ing to the court's decision on the merits. The instant court did not know
whether the potential control was in fact exercised by the employer.2 8 It
could have declared the retirement committee not to be indispensable, risk-
ing the possibility of a decision on the merits being undone by a contrary
ruling by the committee. Or it could have held the committee to be indis-
pensable and dismissed the plaintiff's action for want of jurisdiction, re-
quiring the plaintiff to bring suit in Illinois where service could have been
obtained on the employer and the resident committee. However, were the
employer to appoint citizens of different states to the committee, which it had
the power to do at any time, plaintiff would have again been presented
with the barrier of obtaining service. Recognizing the employer's power
to control the membership of the committee, the court, acting through its
equity power, adopted a third course by ordering the employer to bring the
retirement committee before the court at the employer's expense 29 for a full
hearing on the merits.3° Presumably, the employer, punishable by con-
tempt, could exercise his power to appoint a new committee if the present
one refused to attend. The result reached by the court prevents the em-
ployer from utilizing the indispensable party doctrine and his ability to
control retirement committee membership to effectively preclude litigation
by beneficiaries under the pension trust agreement. It also obviates the
need to determine whether the emplQyer actually controls the decisions of
its retirement committee, a collateral issue which plaintiff should not have to
litigate in seeking determination of rights under the pension trust agree-
ment.
27. Id. §§ 401, 404. A pension plan within the meaning of § 401 (a) is a plan main-
tained by an employer primarily to provide systematic payment of definitely determinable
benefits to his employees over a period of years, usually for life, after retirement. The
plan must be permanent and contributions fixed without being geared to profits. It must
be impossible under the trust instrument for any part of the corpus or income to be
used for purposes other than the exclusive benefit of employees or their beneficiaries. A
plan is not acceptable unless an employee is permitted to receive the benefits under the
plan without the consent of the employer. FED. TAx. REo. §§ 1.401-1 Ca)-(c)
(1957); 5 CCH 1953 STAND. FXD. TAX Rzp. ff 6131.
28. Instant case at 174.
29. In the pension plan agreement the employer had expressly agreed to pay all
expenses of the trustee and retirement committee, to indemnify them fully against all
costs and losses, and provide and pay for all legal services. Id. at 171.
30. Id. at 175.
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Labor Law-
NLRB ABANDONS RULE THAT UNFAIRLY DISCHARGED
EMPLOYEE'S DUTY TO MITIGATE EMPLOYER'S
BACK PAY LIABILITY IS SATISFIED BY REGISTRATION
WITH FEDERAL OR STATE EMPLOYMENT AGENCY
The NLRB, in dealing with unfair labor practices, has discretionary
power to order "reinstatement of employees with or without back pay, as
will effectuate the policies" of the Labor Management Relations Act.1 In
a decision involving the discriminatory discharge of employees who had
engaged in short work stoppages to protest improper working conditions,
the Board announced that in applying the requirement that employees mit-
igate employers' back pay liability by making a reasonable search for sub-
stantially equivalent employment, it no longer regards an employee's regis-
tration with a federal or state employment service as conclusive proof that
such a search has been made.2 Hereafter, each back pay case will be de-
cided on its facts, and registration will be accorded "greater or less weight
depending upon all the circumstances." 3 Southern Silk Mills, Inc., 33
L.R.R.M. 1317 (NLRB Aug. 22, 1956).
Back pay awards make an employee whole for any loss in wages re-
sulting from his being discriminated against for exercising rights guaran-
teed him by the LMRA,3 and at the same time serve to deter discrimina-
tory conduct by employers 4 Initially, the Board imposed no duty on an
employee entitled to back pay to make any effort to secure other employment
in mitigation of the employer's liability.5 However, in Phelps Dodge Corp.
v. NLRB, despite the Board's contention that a mitigation doctrine would
not be administratively feasible,7 the Supreme Court, on the theory that it
would promote production and employment, limited recovery of back pay
1. 61 STAT. 147 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1952).
2. Applying the new test, the Board, nevertheless, granted back pay. Instant case
at 1319.
3. See Notes, 50 YAL4 L.J. 507, 510-11 (1941), 48 YAt L.J. 1265 (1939). The
act protects the right of employees to either engage in or refrain from engaging in self
organization, collective bargaining, the formation of labor organizations, and concerted
activities designed to implement these rights. 61 STAT. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 157
(1952). The back pay provisions of the act encompass discrimination practiced by both
employers and labor organizations. 61 STAT. 147 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1952).
However, since it is more commonly the employer who is at fault, this Comment is
phrased in terms of employer discriminatory conduct although applicable to both sit-
uations.
4. Notes, 37 ILL. L. REv. 441 447 449-50 (1943), 89 U. PA. L. REv. 648, 650-51
(1941), 50 YAX* L.J. 507, 510-11 (1941), 48 YAI., L.J. 1265 (1939).
5. Western Felt Works, 10 N.L.R.B. 407, 451 (1938). The Board adhered to a
policy of deducting only net earnings, i.e., actual earnings minus expenses incurred in
seeking work and in working elsewhere. See also NLRB v. Carlisle Lumber Co., 99
F2d 533, 540 (9th Cir. 1938), cert denied, 306 U.S. 646 (1939).
6. 313 U.S. 177 (1941).
7. The Board argued that the task of determining the available employment op-
portunities and the sufficiency of the employee's efforts in each instance would be an
insuperable burden. Brief for Appellees, pp. 56-57, Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB,
313 U.S. 177 (1941).
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to exclude losses "willfully incurred." 8 The Board subsequently inter-
preted "willfully incurred" to mean rejecting an offer or leaving desirable
employment without justification.9 During World War II, in an attempt
to alleviate the manpower shortage, the Board changed its policy to re-
quire reasonable efforts to secure substantially equivalent employment.' °
As this rule was applied, however, registration with a federal or state em-
ployment service "1 was deemed to be conclusive proof that a reasonable ef-
fort had been made.'2 Where an employee failed to register, the employer
could avoid liability if the employee's other efforts to find work were not
reasonable. 13 This standard was continued after the war; 14 but in NLRB
v. Pugh & Barr, Ixw., 15 where the Board attempted to enforce an award of
$5381.40 to an employee who had earned only $294.20 1 during a two-year
period, the Fourth Circuit rejected the conclusive presumption afforded by
registration in view of the extended period of time, the small earnings,
and the large award. The Board restricted application of this case to its
facts, and, until the instant case, continued to follow the registration cri-
terion.17 The basis for the change in the instant case was the Board's
belief that the effectiveness of employment services is variable and that
to require independent efforts to find work would implement the policy of
promoting production and employment.' 8
Under this decision the expedient of registration will no longer im-
munize the idler against loss of back pay. But a probable consequence of
the instant decision will be realization of the administrative difficulties
envisioned by the Board in the Phelps Dodge case. Beyond the necessity
of hearing testimony concerning efforts to secure employment, the Board
will be required to gather evidence of the employment opportunities in the
area in order to determine the "reasonableness" of the employees' efforts,
8. 313 U.S. at 198-200.
9. See Ohio Public Service Co., 52 N.L.R.B. 725, 729 (1943), enforcement granted,
144 F.2d 252 (6th Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 324 U.S. 857 (1945).
10. Ibid. An employee is not required to seek or accept employment inferior to that
denied him as a result of the discrimination. Instant case at 1319.
11. Originally, only registration with the United States Employment Service was
recognized. This was later extended to include state services. Harvest Queen Mill &
Elevator Co., 90 N.L.R.B. 320, 322 (1950).
12. A deduction from the employer's liability continued to be made for losses "will-
fully incurred." Ohio Public Service Co., 52 N.L.R.B. 725, 729 (1943), enforcement
granted, 144 F.2d 252 (6th Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 324 U.S. 857 (1945).
13. Ibid.
14. See Columbia Pictures Corp., 82 N.L.R.B. 568, 580 (1949), enforcement
denied on other grounds, NLRB v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 191 F.2d 217 (9th Cir.
1951). This extension was formally announced in Harvest Queen Mill & Elevator Co.,
90 N.L.R.B. 320, 321 (1950).
15. 207 F.2d 409 (4th Cir. 1953).
16. These figures were later corrected to $5299.65 and $330.95. Pugh & Barr, Inc.,
110 N.L.R.B. 1353 (1954), enforcement granted, 231 F.2d 558 (4th Cir. 1956).
17. See, e.g., Venetian Blind Workers' Union, 110 N.L.R.B. 780, 787 (1954);
Sterling Furniture Co., 109 N.L.R.B. 602, 607 (1954), enforcement granted, 227 F.2d
521 (9th Cir. 1955). But cf. Efco Mfg., Inc., 111 N.L.tRB. 1032 (1955) (no exclusive
reliance placed upon registration).
18. Instant case at 1319.
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thereby increasing the administrative burden in terms of time, effort and
expense. Additional litigation may conceivably develop over whether po-
tential sources of employment which the employee has failed to explore
are "substantially equivalent" to his former position."9 The possibility
of such a time consuming collateral issue emerging is strengthened because
a substantial portion, if not the majority, of the back pay cases will prob-
ably involve those who had been employed in positions demanding no par-
ticular skill, for skilled workers should more easily secure new situations
and an employer will be more reluctant to dismiss them due to the difficulty
of finding suitable replacements. The equivalency of alternative positions
is more subject to dispute in the case of an unskilled employee than where
the employee possesses a definite skill that can be collated with job oppor-
tunities which the employer contends should have been exhausted. This
problem is obviated under the prior rule, for registration precludes further
inquiry. Moreover, since the test of "reasonableness" is at best a specula-
tive one, an employer may be encouraged to challenge many claims in the
hope that a few may be disallowed. Such conduct would entail no great
expense,20 for although the Board has consistently held that the employer
has the burden of proof on the issue of mitigation, 21 the procedure followed
in back pay hearings allows the employer to rely upon the testimony of the
employee to meet this burden.- Furthermore, there is a danger that the
amorphous nature of the rule might deter employees from exerting rights
19. Such litigation has already developed in cases where the employee had failed to
register. See NLRB v. Moss Planing Mill Co., 224 F.2d 702, 705 (4th Cir. 1955)
(lumber mill workers obligated to seek employment in agricultural work) ; Scamprufe,
Inc., 106 N.L.R.B. 1143, 1144 (1953) (work in laundry and telephone company held to
be substantially equivalent to former position of machine operator and inspector in
garment factory, primarily because of lack of any particular skill involved in former
position). There exist no definite criteria to determine what is "substantially equiva-
lent." The Board has stated that it must be "substantially equivalent to the position
from which he was discharged and... suitable to a person of his background and ex-
perience. The types of employment which fit this standard will depend upon the circum-
stances of each case," Instant case at 1319. An employer might well conclude from
this uncertainty that his most fertile source of mitigation lies in an employee's failure
to canvass certain categories of employment.
20. The only significant item of expense might be the compilation of data concern-
ing employment opportunities. The desired information could probably be obtained at
little cost from the employment service in the area.
21. See, e.g., instant case at 1319; Ohio Pub. Serv. Co., 52 N.L.R.B. 725, 729
(1943), enforcement granted, 144 F.2d 252 (6th Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 324 'f.S. 857
(1945). But cf. NLRB v. Pugh & Barr, Inc., 207 F2d 409 (4th Cir. 1953), 52 MIcH.
L. RE:v. 923 (1954) (employee compelled to show that he had made a reasonable.effort) ;
Venetian Blind Workers' Union, 110 N.L.R.B. 780, 788 (1954) (finding that eirployee
failed to make reasonable effort to secure employment although employer adduced no
evidence on the issue).
22. Normally, when the employer contests an award, the Board counsel-who is
endeavoring to sustain the full award--calls the employee to the stand and examines him
concerning his efforts to find employment. Interview with Mr. Bernard Samoff, Chief
Field Examiner, NLRB (Philadelphia, District 4), January 1957. Even if the Board
were to alter this procedure to compel the employer to submit proof of a lack of reason-
able effort, the fact that the information is within the peculiar knowledge of the em-
ployee would necessitate allowing the employer to meet his burden by either calling the
employee as a witness or by pre-trial examination of the employee. This process is fol-
lowed in actions for breach of employment contracts. MCCORMIcK, DAMAGSS § 159
(1935).
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enumerated in the LMRA 2 through fear of not receiving back pay in the
event of a discriminatory discharge.2 4 However, the cases in which the
"reasonableness" standard has been construed indicate that a "good faith"
effort will be sufficient,2 5 thereby diminishing although not negating the
cogency of this danger.
2 6
In light of these problems the Board's justification of the instant de-
cision 2 7 is hardly compelling. An analysis of the procedures used by the
employment services tends to solidify this belief, for they appear to afford
adequate coverage of job opportunities in a given labor market.2s The
Board's criticism that "their effectiveness . . . varies widely with the
type and supply of labor being sought" - overlooks the fact that as the
type and supply of labor sought fluctuates, the efficiency of any system
of placement will vary. Should the category demanded be a singular one,
or the supply abundant, it might be anticipated that efforts by one en-
gaged in a personal search for employment will also meet with indifferent
success. It is conceded that the services are deficient to the extent that
some employers do not utilize them; but this is partially offset by the
greatly expanded coverage of the labor market that they achieve, and by
the fact that many employers rely upon them exclusively.3 0 Perhaps the
principal defect in the system is the ability of a registrant to avoid employ-
23. See note 3 supra.
24. It might be argued that this uncertainty of recovery will result in a greater
effort by the employee to insure against later disqualification. However, normal un-
certainty and economic necessity will probably achieve similar results in most instances.
See text at note 33 infra.
25. See, e.g., instant case; American Bottling Co., 33 L.R.R.M. 1465 CNLRB
Oct. 15, 1956); Pugh & Barr, Inc., 110 N.L.R.B. 1353 (1954), enforcement granted,
231 F.2d 558 (4th Cir. 1956).
26. While an identical standard of mitigation has been successfully utilized in
common law actions for breach of employment contracts, see McCoRmiCK, DAMAGES §
158 (1935), different policy considerations are presented by the LMRA as evidenced by
the requirement that the Board's discretion in awarding back pay be exercised in a
manner designed to promote the purposes of the act. 61 STAT. 147 (1947), 29 U.S.C.
§ 160(c) (1952). For a discussion of this aspect of the back pay award see Farber,
Reversion to Individualism: The Back-Pay Doctrines of the NLRB, 7 IND. & LAB.
REL. Rzv. 262 (1954).
27. See text at note 18 supra.
28. The procedure followed by the Philadelphia office of the Pennsylvania State
Employment Service is typical, although modifications exist in various states both as to
procedure and efficiency in implementation. When an applicant registers he is inter-
viewed to determine his qualifications. He is then classified in accordance with the
categories enumerated in the Dictionary of Occupational Titles. The applicant must
thereafter report to the Service once a month in order to keep his registration active.
The office retains a staff of thirty people who devote full time to canvassing the em-
ployers in the area. Major employers-those employing fifty or more-are visited
regularly. Although visits to other employers follow no set schedule, they are contacted
continuously by telephone. In addition, literature is sent every month to each employer
in the area. When job openings appear they are correlated with the qualification cards
on file, and, if possible, several applicants are directed to the prospective employer. The
Service maintains a clearance system on local, statewide and national levels, enabling
each office to utilize the resources of others. Many employers, by virtue of agreements
between union, management and the Service, hire exclusively through the Service. Inter-
view with Mr. Daniel J. Littley, District Manager, Pennsylvania State Employment
Service (Philadelphia), Feb. 13, 1957.
29. Instant case at 1319.
30. See note 28 supra.
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ment by purposely conveying a poor impression to an employer who has
requested the service to supply applicants for a position.Y1 It might be
argued that such devious conduct is less probable under the new rule since
an employee will be aware that his efforts will be scrutinized. This objec-
tion fails to consider that the Board investigation will probably concern
the persistency of an employee's efforts rather than their quality.
2
Even assuming that the instant change is better suited to the task of
promoting production and employment, there are indications that it may
be superfluous. An employee has no certitude that he will be eligible for
back pay, for eligibility is dependent upon a Board finding that he was dis-
criminated against. Even if he were willing to hazard reliance upon a
mere expectancy, the pressure of economic necessity will, in the vast major-
ity of cases, necessitate a search for a new income source regardless of Board
requirements, for there is no moratorium on debts and living expenses
during the period (often a prolonged one) between discharge and the award
of back pay.P In view of the questionable accomplishment of the instant
decision and the concomitant problems, it represents an unwise departure
from established practice.
Securities and Exchange Commission-
CORPORATION HAS NO IMPLIED CIVIL REMEDY UNDER
SECTION 14(a) OF THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE
ACT
Minority stockholder brought a derivative action in a federal district
court against the directors of his corporation for rescission or damages re-
sulting from the sale of the corporation's principal assets at a price as-
serted to be substantially less than the assets were reasonably worth. The
complaint alleged that the proxy statements which the directors had used
to solicit the requisite stockholder approval ' for the contract were false
and misleading. Relief was sought under section 14(a) of the Securities
and Exchange Act, making it "unlawful" to solicit proxies in contravention
31. Interview with Mr. Daniel J. Littley, District Manager, Pennsylvania State
Employment Service (Philadelphia), Feb. 13, 1957.
32. The cases in which the rule has been applied support this assertion. See, e.g.,
instant case; American Bottling Co., 38 L.R.R.M. 1465 CNLRB Oct. 15, 1956). As a
practical matter, analysis of an employee's applications would necessitate adducing
testimony from the management official who had conducted the interview, thereby
further prolonging the hearing and adding to its cost. Furthermore, a "poor impression!
is an intangible concept, and it would be difficult to present the Board with any concrete
data sufficient to impugn the employee's motive.
33. This argument was advanced by justice Murphy in Phelps Dodge Corp. v.
NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 207 (1941) (dissenting opinion).
1. Under New York law such a sale required the approval of the holders of at least
two-thirds of the outstanding stock of the selling corporation. N.Y. STocn CoRp. LAw
§ 20.
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of the rules laid down by the Securities and Exchange Commission.2 Plain-
tiff claimed a violation of rule X-14A-9 which prohibits solicitations by
means of a proxy statement which is "false and misleading with respect
to any material fact, or which omits to state any material fact necessary
in order to make the statements therein not false or misleading." 3 There
being no provision for private civil remedies under section 14(a), the dis-
trict court dismissed the complaint 4 and the circuit court affirmed, holding
that a civil remedy should not be implied under section 14(a) in favor of
a corporation injured by a violation of the proxy rules.5 Howard v. Furst,
238 F. 2d 790 (2d Cir. 1956).
Federal courts have implied civil remedies in regulatory acts; 6 but
the decisions have not been consistent, even in the construction of the
same statute.7 Absent any clear expression of congressional intent, sev-
eral factors have guided the courts in reaching a result. Express provi-
sion of remedies in certain sections of an act has been held to preclude
their implication in other sections.8 Likewise, where an administrative
agency has been granted remedies sufficient to accomplish the purposes of
the statute, civil remedies have been denied. 9 A principal consideration
has been the adequacy of the protection afforded plaintiff by available com-
mon-law remedies.10 In applying these considerations the courts have at-
2. 48 STAT. 895 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1952).
3. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9 (Supp. 1955).
4. Howard v. Furst, 140 F. Supp. 507 (S.D.N.Y. 1956).
5. Plaintiff in the instant case also alleged a cause of action under state law for
waste of corporate assets. The court, after denying the federal claim, refused to decide
the state issue, dismissing the cause of action for lack of jurisdiction. Instant case at
794. Federal jurisdiction in the instant case was predicated on the existence of a federal
question arising under a statute of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1952). In
order to constitute a federal question, the right or immunity alleged to have been cre-
ated by the statute must be an essential element of the plaintiff's cause of action. Gully
v. First Nat'l Bank, 299 U.S. 109 (1936) ; Brown v. Coumanis, 135 F.2d 163 (5th Cir.
1943). As to what constitutes a "federal question," see Chadbourn & Levin, Original
Jurisdiction of Federal Questions, 90 U. PA. L. Rxv. 639 (1942); Forrester, The
Nature of a "Federal Question," 16 Tum. L. Rzv. 362 (1942); Mishkin, The Federal
estio the Distrct Courts, 53 CoLUM. L. R.v. 157 (1953). The fact that the
federal question has been decided adversely to the party raising it does not necessarilydeprive the federal court of jurisdiction to decide the local issue. Sler v. Louisville &
Nashville R.R., 213 U.S. 175 (1909); Hum v. Oursler, 289 U.S. 238 (1933); see
HAR & WEC SLa, Tm F zaAJ COURTs AND THE FEDERAL SYSrms 802-09 (1953).
6. Fitzgerald v. Pan Amer. World Airways, Inc., 229 F.2d 499 (2d Cir. 1956),
104 U. P. L. Rxv. 864 (1956) ; Reitmeister v. Reitmeister, 162 F.2d 691 (2d Cir.
1947), discussed in Note, The Use of Criminal Statutes in. the Creation of New Torts,
48 COLUM. L. RrV. 456 (1948).
7. Compare Fratt v. Robinson, 203 F.2d 627 (9th Cir. 1953), with Beury v. Beury,
127 F. Supp. 786 (S.D.W.Va. 1954), aff'd on other grounds, 222 F.2d 464 (4th Cir.
1955).
8. Downing v. Howard, 68 F. Supp. 6, 11 (D. Del. 1946), aff'd on other grounds,
162 F.2d 654 (3d Cir. 1947); see 2 SUTHERLAND, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CON-
sTRUcTioN §§ 4915-17 (3d ed., Horack 1943).
9. See Montana-Dakota Util. Co. v. Northwestern Pub. Serv. Co., 341 U.S. 246,
(1951); id. at 258 (dissenting opinion); Consolidated Freightways, Inc. v. United
Truck Lines, Inc., 216 F2d 543 (9th Cir. 1954), 68 HAv. L. REv. 1272 (1955).
10. Beury v. Beury, 127 F. Supp. 786, 789 (S.D.W.Va. 1954), aff'd on other
grounds, 222 F.2d 464 (4th Cir. 1955); Downing v. Howard, 68 F. Supp. 6 (D. Del.
1946), affd on other grounds, 162 F.2d 654 (3d Cir. 1947); cf. Speed v. Transimerica
Corp., 71 F. Supp. 457 (D. Del. 1947).
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tempted to determine whether the person seeking a remedy is within a rea-
sonably restricted class for whose protection the statute was enacted. 1
The Securities and Exchange Act provides for criminal penalties,'1
for injunctive action by the Securities and Exchange Commission' 3 and
for the voiding of contracts in violation of the statute. 1 4  In addition, civil
remedies are specifically provided for violations of certain sections of the
act.1  There is no civil remedy provided for a violation of section 10(b).:1
But in cases arising under rule X-10b-5,17 promulgated under this section
the federal courts have consistently held that selling shareholders have an
implied civil cause of action because they are within the class to be pro-
tected by the section.' 8 The argument that the existence of specific civil
remedies in three other sections of the act ' 9 negates their implication in
the remaining sections 2 has been rejected on the grounds that the act
represents a comprehensive regulation of securities transactions and that
the implication of a civil remedy for damages for selling shareholders is
not inconsistent with the anti-fraud policy expressed in section 10(b). 21
Whether a civil remedy for damages is to be implied under section 14(a)
for a violation of the proxy rules has not been decided before.22 The in-
stant court summarily dismissed the cases decided under section 10(b) as
not persuasive 3 and denied an implied civil remedy in a corporation on
the grounds that neither the language of the section nor the legislative
history of the act warranted such an inference.
2 4
The implication of a civil right of action for damages would be con-
sistent with the purpose of section 14(a), i.e., to eliminate fraud in the
solicitation of proxies and, generally, to furnish more adequate protection
11. See Reitmeister Y. Reitmeister, 162 F.2d 691 (2d Cir. 1947); Goldstein v.
Groesbeck, 142 F.2d 422 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 737 (1944). See also
2 R sTATrzmNT, TORTS § 286 (1934) ; PROSsrR, TORTS § 34 (2d ed. 1955).
12. 48 STAT. 904 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78ff (1952).
13. 48 STAT. 899 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78u (1952).
14. 48 STAT. 903 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78cc (1952).
15. 48 STAT. 897 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78r (1952); 48 STAT. 889
(1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78i (1952); 48 STAT. 896 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1952); see
Loss, SXCcUuTIS RGULATION 1032 (1951).
16. 48 STAT. 891 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1952).
17. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (Supp. 1955).
18. Fratt v. Robinson, 203 F.2d 627 (9th Cir. 1953) ; Fischman v. Raytheon Mfg.
Co., 188 F.2d 783 (2d Cir. 1951); Northern Trust Co. v. Essaness Theatres Corp.,
103 F. Supp. 954 (N.D. I1. 1952); Osborne v. Mallory, 86 F. Supp. 869 (S.D.N.Y.
(1949) ; see Leech, Transactions in Corporate Control, 104 U. PA. L. Rtv. 725, 831
(1956); Note, Civil Liability Under Ride X-10b-5, 42 VA. L. RiV. 537 (1956).
19. See note 15 supra.
20. 2 SUTHMLAND, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION §§ 4915-17 (3d ed.,
Horack 1943).
21. Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946); Baird v.
Franklin, 141 F.2d 238, 245 (2d Cir. 1944) (dissenting opinion); see also SEC v. C.M.
Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344, 350 (1943); Note, Implied Liability Under the
Securities Exchange Act, 61 HARV. L. RIZv. 858, 861 (1948).
22. See Subin v. Goldsmith, 224 F.2d 753 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 883
(1955) ; see also Fitzpatrick v. Eblen, Civ. No. 3585, D. Minn., Dec. 28, 1950.
23. Instant case at 793.
24. Id. at 793.
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from the abuses of corporate management.2 A corporation can be said
to be within the class to be protected by the statute in that it may sustain
injury through fraud in proxy solicitations if permission, otherwise unob-
tainable, is thereby gained for a sale of corporate assets at less than their
reasonable value. However, a state remedy was available under the allega-
tions of the instant case. The stockholder, suing in the corporate interest,
could have obtained an injunction before the sale was consummated;26 or
a derivative action would lie after the sale for rescission 2 7 or for damages
resulting from a waste of corporate assets.28 This would seem to preclude
the need for a federal remedy under section 14(a) were it not for the fact
that state law places impediments in the path of a stockholder who would
bring the derivative action. Besides his own cost risk, such stockholder
may be met with a "security for costs" requirement - and with collateral
defenses such as failure to exhaust intracorporate remedies. Because a
federal court would be free to reject these requirements and defenses if a
federal statute were involved,30 it might be argued that the federal corporate
remedy should be implied. Such an action would be justifiable as a pro-
phylactic to secure adherence to the proxy rules, but potential gain in this
direction must be weighed against the consequences of providing an easy
federal alternative to the state derivative suit. State impediments to the
bringing of derivative suits -are to prevent the harassment of corporate man-
agement and the frittering away of corporate assets in defense of ground-
less suits, and to guard against suits brought for the purpose of exacting
a settlement. The debatable value of removing these impediments, when
coupled with the fact that easy access to the federal remedy would probably
lead to substitution of federal supervision over intracorporate matters only
incidental to the use of proxies, would seem to require a concrete expres-
sion of congressional intent in order to imply the remedy without the imped-
iments. And since implication of the federal corporate remedy without at
the same time facilitating the bringing of derivative actions would merely
duplicate the present state situation, the conclusion seems necessary that
the federal corporate remedy should not be implied.
State law affords less protection to the interests of individual share-
holders than it does to those of the corporation.3 ' A shareholder has no
25. Loss, ScuRIus R~GuJLATioN 521-26 (1951) ; see Orrick, The Revired Proxy
Rules of the Securities and Exchange Commission, 16 FzM. B.J. 11 (1956).
26. Holcomb v. Forsyth, 216 Ala. 486, 113 So. 516 (1927) ; Van Tassel v. Spring
Perch Co., 113 Conn. 636, 155 Atl. 832 (1931) ; see 10 Fi.L=cHM, PaIvATrX CoRoATioNs
§ 4860 (rev. perm. ed. 1931).
27. 13 FLnCHER, PRIVAv CORPORATIONS § 6040 (perm. ed. rev. repl. 1943).
28. Isaac v. Marcus, 258 N.Y. 257, 179 N.E. 487 (1932) ; Bassett v. Battle, 253
App. Div. 893, 1 N.Y.S.2d 869 (2d Dep't 1938) ; 13 FL=CHtR, PRIVAT CORPORATIONS
§ 5926 (perm. ed. rev. repl. 1943) ; see Note, Derivative Actions: Policy Considerations
Leading to Choice of Derivative Form: Individual Recovery in Derivative Action, 40
CALn. L. Riv. 127 (1952).
29. See, e.g., N.Y. G.N. Copp,. LAw § 61-b; see also Note, Stockholders' Derivative
Suit, 1956 Wis. L. Ra~v. 322.
30. Fielding v. Allen, 181 F.2d 163 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 817 (1950).
See FzI. R. Civ. P. 23 (b).
31. See Emerson & Latcham, SEC Proxy Regulation: Steps Toward Mere Effec-
tive Stockholder Participation, 59 YA~t L.J. 635, 636 (1950).
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right of action in his own name for damages or rescission resulting from a
wasting of corporate assets.& 2 Neither may he complain as an individual
of depreciation in the value of his stock caused by the wrongful act of the
corporate officers or directors if the injury is not peculiar to his own stock,
but falls alike on all other shareholders of the corporation.3 However, fed-
eral courts have recognized the right of a shareholder to enjoin the use of
false or misleading materials in the solicitation of proxies. 4  And where
proxies have already been solicited through the use of fraudulent materials,
a shareholder's suit to enjoin the use of the proxies has been sustained. 5 In
addition, the shareholder receives some protection from the injunctive
powers of the Securities and Exchange Commission. 6 But both the indi-
vidual and the Commission's injunctive remedies are unavailing if not
promptly exercised. And once there has been injury, the shareholder's in-
terest may not be fully protected by a corporate recovery of damages.37 This
suggests the need for an implied individual remedy for damages under sec-
tion 14(a). However, the same factors that have led states to deny such a
remedy indicate that the federal remedy should also be denied. There is
the practical problem of the measure of damages, though if the remedy is
viewed as a prophylactic to secure adherence to the proxy rules, the meas-
ure might be the full loss in market value of the shares of stock held by
the plaintiff. Of greater significance, the individual right of action would
raise in an aggravated form the problems of harassment of corporate man-
agement with resultant expense to the corporation and strike suits to com-
pel settlements. Even if potential abuse is not a deterrent to implication
of the remedy, the problem of substitution of a federal common law of
corporations remains. A private injunctive remedy to prevent the use of
improperly solicited proxies would appear to be a proper limit for the
federal courts under section 14(a). Once the proxy is used and there-
after a transaction is consummated resulting in detriment to the share-
holders, a federal remedy should not be implied without some dear expres-
sion of congressional intent.
32. Weinstein v. Behn, 65 N.Y.S.2d 536 (Sup. Ct. 1946), aff'd, 272 App. Div. 1045,
75 N.Y.S.2d 284 (lst Dep't 1947) ; Continental Securities Co. v. Belmont, 150 App.
Div. 298, 134 N.Y. Supp. 635 (2d Dep't), affd, 206 N.Y. 7, 99 N.E. 138 (1912);
see 13 FLETCHER, PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 5924 (perm. ed. rev. repl. 1943).
33. Niles v. New York Cent H.R.R., 176 N.Y. 119, 68 N.E. 142 (1903); see
FLETCHER, PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 5913 (perm. ed. rev. repl. 1943).
34. See A.ANOW & ENHom, PROXY CONTESTS FOR CORPORATE CONTROL 418
(1957).
35. Textron, Inc. v. American Co., 122 F. Supp. 305, 308 (D. Mass. 1954);
Phillips v. United Corp., CCH FED. SEc. LAW Stov. (2d ed.) 190,395 (S.D.N.Y.
1947); cf. Weeks v. Alpert, 131 F. Supp. 608 (D. Mass. 1955).
36. See note 13 supra.
37. See notes 27 and 28 supra; cf. Berger, "Disregarding the Corporate Entity"
for Stockholder.' Benefit, 55 CoLum. L. REv. 808 (1955).
